Prenatal screening, reproductive choice, and public health by Wilkinson, Stephen











One widely held view of prenatal screening (PNS) is that its foremost aim is,
or should be, to enable reproductive choice; this is the PureChoice view. The
article critiques this position by comparing it with an alternative: Public Health
Pluralism. It is argued that there are good reasons to prefer the latter,
including the following. (1) Public Health Pluralism does not, as is often
supposed, render PNSmore vulnerable to eugenics-objections. (2) ThePure
Choice view, if followed through to its logical conclusions, may have unpal-
atable implications, such as extending choice well beyond health screening.
(3) Any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism will be capable of taking
on board the moral seriousness of abortion and will advocate, where
practicable, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of disease and
disability. (4) Public Health Pluralism is at least as well-equipped as the Pure
Choice model to deal with autonomy and consent issues.
1. INTRODUCTION
Promoting informed choice is commonly recognized as
the chief purpose and benefit of prenatal screening, its
very presence being viewed as a key way in which the
process can be distanced from eugenics.1
As Clare Williams and her colleagues note (above), one
widely held view of prenatal screening (PNS) is that its
aim is, or should be, to enable reproductive choice. This is
the Pure Choice model. According to this view, PNS is
importantly different from most other screening pro-
grammes, where the aim is not choice per se but rather to
improve public health (for example, by allowing the
detection, prevention, and treatment of disease) or to
reduce healthcare costs.2
Why might one think that the proper goal of PNS is
choice? Two main answers are offered. First, it is sug-
gested that there is something ethically problematic about
governments attempting to achieve health goals by
encouraging or facilitating abortion. Antina de Jong and
her colleagues, for example, state that:
Enabling meaningful reproductive choice with regard
to parenting or avoiding a child with a serious disorder
or disability is (or should be) the very aim of offering
testing for fetal abnormalities. This is in order to
ensure that abortion decisions remain personal and are
not turned into instruments of societal goals, such as
prevention and cost-reduction by bringing down the
number of people requiring life-long and costly care.3
Second, it is argued that PNS programmes are less
vulnerable to objections couched in terms of disability
rights and eugenics if their purpose is to enable choice,
rather than to reduce the prevalence of disability:
If informed decisions rather than abortion rates are
taken as a measure of success, the disability rights cri-
tique is less convincing.4
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes
two possible views about PNS: the Pure Choice view just
1 C. Williams, P. Alderson, B. Farsides. Too many choices? Hospital
and community staff reflect on the future of prenatal screening. Soc Sci
Med 2002; 55: 743–753: 43. See also: S. John. Efficiency, responsibility
and disability: Philosophical lessons from the savings argument for
pre-natal diagnosis. Politics Philosophy & Economics 2014. doi: 10.1177/
1470594X13505412.
2 J. Childress et al. Public Health Ethics: mapping the terrain. J Law
Med Ethics 2002; 30: 170–178; N. Juth, C. Munthe. The Ethics of
Screening in Health Care and Medicine: serving society or serving the
patient?. Dordrecht: Springer. 2012.
3 A. de Jong, et al. Advances in prenatal screening: the ethical dimen-
sion. Nat Rev Genet 2011; 12; 657–663: 657.
4 Ibid.
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mentioned, and an alternative termed Public Health Plu-
ralism. It then proceeds to offer some reasons for prefer-
ring the latter. Section 3 looks at a possible objection to
Public Health Pluralism: de Jong’s claim that we must
‘ensure that abortion decisions remain personal and are
not turned into instruments of societal goals’.5 Finally,
Section 4 looks at consent issues: specifically the claim
that, since it is (allegedly) difficult for many women to
adequately understand (and validly consent to) prenatal
tests, we should be wary about making such tests part of
public health policy.
2. PURE CHOICE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH PLURALISM
This section does three things. First, it describes the dif-
ferences between the Pure Choice view and Public Health
Pluralism. Second, it examines the supposition that the
Pure Choice view is relatively immune to charges of dis-
ability discrimination and eugenics. Finally, it raises a
potential problem for the Pure Choice view: the sugges-
tion that it may have unpalatable implications.
2.1 Public Health Pluralism
Public Health Pluralism comprises two basic tenets:
(a) that the best rationale for a systematic state-
supported PNS programme includes several differ-
ent elements (hence ‘pluralism’); and
(b) that amongst the most important of those elements
are public health goals (hence ‘public health’).
The Pure Choice view denies both (a) and (b). It denies
(a) because it says that there is only a single aim only:
providing choice. It denies (b) because choice is not a
public health aim. Proponents of the Pure Choice view
could argue that promoting choice is a public health aim
(in which case they would deny only (a)) but this is
implausible, chiefly because adding choice seems to be a
good which is independent of health and, while there are
situations in which adding choice may promote health
(adding contraceptive options perhaps), there are equally
situations in which it can diminish health (e.g. if access to
alcohol and other recreational drugs were to become
easier). The ensuing discussion then assumes that,
although providing choice may well be a good thing and
a legitimate aim for national health services, providing
choice is not in itself a public health aim, because it is not
necessarily linked to positive health outcomes.6
That, then, is a schematic definition of Public Health
Pluralism. Within this view, or family of views, there are
then many possible variants depending on (amongst
other things) what list of goals is attached to PNS and
what view of public health is taken. For now, I am going
merely to suggest that the following is a plausible list of
goals (in no particular order):
(i) improving population health, by reducing the
prevalence of disability and disease in the new-born
population;
(ii) improving maternal and fetal health;
(iii) reducing future health and social welfare costs
and/or increasing the cost-effectiveness of future
health and social welfare spending (either through
(i) and (ii), or as an independent goal)
(iv) respecting autonomy, requiring valid consent
(where practicable), and providing choice (where
appropriate).7
(ii) is relatively uncontroversial. (i) and (iii) are more
controversial for reasons explored later. (iv) is notewor-
thy because it allows the Public Health Pluralist to agree
with many proponents of the Pure Choice view that
autonomy, choice, and consent are important goods.
Thus, on the account sketched here, both positions can
attach positive value to autonomy and choice. The dif-
ference between them is that the Public Health Pluralist
view also sees things other than choice as amongst the
most important aims of a state-supported PNS system.
2.2 Disability Discrimination and Eugenics
One of the main concerns about using PNS and abortion
to ‘select out’ disability is that it is allegedly eugenic and
sends out an unacceptably negative message to and about
people with disabilities. As Tom Shakespeare puts it:
. . . it may be claimed that prenatal diagnosis discrimi-
nates against disabled children and adults, because it
sends the message that it would have been better if
they, too, had not been born. The argument is often
called ‘the expressivist objection’, because it suggests
5 Ibid.
6 It is notable that the British National Health Service website, for
example, is presently called NHS Choices: your health, your choices. See:
http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/HomePage.aspx.
7 Because of the Non-Identity Problem, some (perhaps many) of these
public health goals will be achieved not by benefitting or curing deter-
mine individuals, but through selective reproduction. Unlike many
other public health programmes, reproductive public health pro-
grammes achieve their goals in part by causing different healthier pos-
sible future people to come to exist: different people, that is, from those
who would have existed were it not for the public health programme;
Brock D. The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms – the case of
wrongful handicaps. Bioethics 1995; 9: 269–275; T. Hope, J. McMillan.
Physicians’ duties and the Non-Identity Problem. Am J Bioeth 2012; 12:
21–29; D. Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1984; S. Wilkinson. Selective Reproduction, Eugenics, and Public
Health. In Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and
Practice. A. Dawson, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2011. 48–66.
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that genetic diagnosis and selective abortion ‘expresses’
discriminatory or negative views towards disabled
people.8
Public health and health-economic approaches to
PNS policy are thought by some to be especially vulner-
able to this kind of criticism because they explicitly aim to
reduce the prevalence of disability in the new-born popu-
lation.9 The Pure Choice model, on the other hand, is
often thought to be less vulnerable. As de Jong et al. put
it:
If informed decisions rather than abortion rates are
taken as a measure of success, the disability rights cri-
tique is less convincing.10
But is this really the case? As far as eugenics is con-
cerned, many people have made the point that (depend-
ing of course on how it is defined) eugenics need not be
state eugenics and need not be authoritarian. King, for
example, states that:
In the conventional definition, the key aspect of eugen-
ics is coercion of people’s reproductive choices, for
social ends, which may include ‘improving the quality
of the population’, ‘preventing suffering of future gen-
erations’ or reducing financial costs to the state. [. . .]
However, examination of the history of eugenics
reveals that coercion is certainly not one of its defining
characteristics. From its very beginnings, many eugeni-
cists, including the founder of the eugenics movement,
Francis Galton, were opposed to coercion.11
King has a point. While one could define eugenics in a
way that makes state coercion an essential element, this
would be out of keeping with much present and historical
usage of the term. So it is at least arguable that ‘liberal
eugenics’ is as properly eugenic, so to speak, as ‘authori-
tarian eugenics’ although (as I have argued elsewhere) it
is not clear that there is necessarily much wrong with
liberal eugenics, provided that the means used to pursue
it are not themselves unethical.12
Similar considerations apply to the beliefs about dis-
ability on which PNS is based and the message that it
sends out. That is, it can be plausibly argued that there is
not much difference, as far as negative attitudes to dis-
ability are concerned, between a screening programme
which aims to reduce the prevalence of disability and one
that merely aims to provide choice, if it is known that
most people, when given a choice, choose to avoid dis-
ability. Down’s syndrome is a good example here, as it
has been reported that around 90% of Down’s syndrome
diagnoses in the UK result in termination.13
Consider, for example, a parallel with fetal sex selec-
tion and imagine two scenarios. In the first, the state aims
to reduce the prevalence of girls and encourages this by
offering sex testing early in pregnancy. In the second, the
state merely aims to give families choice and so offers sex
testing early in pregnancy, but knows full well that,
because the population is sexist, 90% of people will
choose to abort girls. As far as the message sent out about
the value of women is concerned, it might plausibly be
argued that there is not much difference between these
two scenarios.
‘Disability rights’ critics may say that PNS for disabil-
ity is just like the sex selection case in this respect. Given
that (for example) we know that 90% of prospective
mothers will choose to end their pregnancies following a
diagnosis of Down’s syndrome, in practice (they may
argue) there is little difference between a system that aims
only to promote choice and one which aims directly to
reduce the prevalence of Down’s, since reduced preva-
lence of Down’s is the known outcome in both cases. It
may also be argued that just as providing sex testing
would be a way of aiding and abetting sexist parents in
their attempts to get rid of female fetuses, screening for
disability is similarly a way of aiding and abetting
disablist parents in their attempts to avoid having a child
with a disability.
I have argued elsewhere that selecting out disability is,
in some important respects, different from sex selection.14
So I do not accept all of this ‘disability critique’ of PNS.
I do however accept the specific point just raised, which is
8 T. Shakespeare. Disability Rights and Wrongs. London: Routledge:
2006. 35. See also: S. Edwards. Disability, identity and the ‘expressivist
objection’. J Med Ethics 2004; 30: 418–420; R. Scott. Prenatal testing,
reproductive autonomy, and disability interests. Camb Q Healthc Ethic;
14: 65–82; S. Wilkinson. Choosing tomorrow’s children: the ethics of
selective reproduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.
9 For a discussion of these issues see (e.g.) the following. A. Asch.
Prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion: a challenge to practice and
policy. Am J Public Health 1999; 89: 1649–1657; A. Davis. A Disabled
Person’s Perspective on Pre-Natal Screening. MIDIRS Midwifery
Digest 1999; 9: 8–10; S. John. Efficiency, responsibility and disability:
philosophical lessons from the savings argument for pre-natal diagno-
sis. J Pol Phil Econ 2014; 13; doi 10.1177/1470594X13505412. (Only
published online at the time of writing); J. Lord. Screened out of Exist-
ence: the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
Selective Screening Policies. International Journal of Disability, Commu-
nity, & Rehabilitation; 12; http://www.ijdcr.ca/VOL12_02/articles/
lord.shtml (e-journal); Wilkinson, op. cit. note 8.
10 A. de Jong et al. Advances in prenatal screening: the ethical dimen-
sion. Nat Rev Genet 2011; 12; 657–63: 657.
11 D. King. The Persistence of Eugenics. GenEthics News 22, http://
www.hgalert.org/topics/geneticDiscrimination/eugenics.htm (online
resource: last accessed February 2014); see also: N. Agar. Liberal eugen-
ics. Public Aff Q 1998; 12: 137–155; N. Agar. Liberal eugenics: in defence
of human enhancement. Oxford: Blackwell; 2004; D. King.
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ‘new’ eugenics. J Med Ethics
1999; 25: 76–182; Wilkinson, op. cit. note 8.
12 Wilkinson, op. cit. note 8; S. Wilkinson, E. Garrard. Eugenics and the
Ethics of Selective Reproduction. Keele: Keele University. 2013.
13 John, op cit., note 2.
14 Wilkinson, op. cit. note 8; Wilkinson & Garrard, op. cit. note 12.
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that there is not a fundamental difference – at least as far
as the ‘message sent out’ to people with disabilities is
concerned – between merely providing choice in a situa-
tion where that will predictably lead to the mass ‘selecting
out’ of disabled fetuses and having a PNS programme
which explicitly aims (through non-coercive and consen-
sual means) to reduce the prevalence of disability in the
new-born population.
Against this, it may be argued that there is a morally
significant difference between, on the one hand, actively
supporting ‘selecting out’ disability and, on the other,
merely allowing it to happen. But, even if there is such a
distinction, this will make little difference to the overall
line of argument here, for the matter under consideration
is not the state’s merely allowing ‘selecting out’ disability.
Rather, the concern of this article is systematic state-
supported PNS programmes. Thus, an appeal to a doing/
allowing or acts/omissions distinction is not going to
bite in this case, since the state is ‘active’ in both cases
(supporting pure choice or supporting selecting out
disability).
Similarly, it may be argued that there is a morally
significant distinction between the state’s, on the one
hand, intentionally reducing the prevalence of disability
in the new-born population and its, on the other, bringing
about the same result as a merely foreseen but unintended
side-effect. Quite how generally significant this kind of
distinction is has been the subject of considerable debate
in moral philosophy over many years.15 But, even leaving
aside any general concerns that one might have about
‘double effect’, the distinction will not take us very far in
this case.
One reason for this is that we are talking about states
and not individual human beings and assigning inten-
tions to intangible entities like states is liable to be espe-
cially problematic. How do we work out what a state
intends and what it merely foresees? Must we do so by
looking inside the minds of presidents, of ministers, of the
parliamentarians who voted for particular measures, or
even of the electorate? Or is state intention an impersonal
emergent property to be divined through a more abstract
interpretative process? These are just questions and I do
not argue here that it is impossible to ascribe intentions to
states. My point rather is that, especially in contested
policy areas, this may be very hard to do. And specifically
in relation to the area under consideration here, disability
rights advocates may well say that even if the stated aim
of government policy is not to eliminate people with dis-
abilities, this is nonetheless the government’s unstated
intention. Whether this is true will vary from case to
case but the general form of the critique is sound: in
particular, the suggestion that we cannot just assume that
governments’ explicitly stated goals are their real goals.
A second reason why ‘double effect’ may not get us
very far is that, if preventing the births of children with
disabilities is as morally problematic as many critics
suppose, then the state would have an obligation not
merely to avoid intentionally preventing those births, but
also a stronger or wider obligation to ensure that its
policies do not foreseeably cause people to stop children
with disabilities from being born. Consider, for example,
a parallel with child abuse. It would not be much of a
defence for the government to say that its policies are
defensible because, although they foreseeably cause child
abuse, the abuse is not what the government intended.
The same then could go for detecting and aborting disa-
bled fetuses. If (and this is a ‘big if’) that is seriously
morally wrong, then stating that it is (‘merely’) a foresee-
able effect of policy, rather than something that the gov-
ernment intends, is not going to be a compelling defence.
So when it comes to deciding between a Pure Choice
and a Public Health Pluralist Model (one which allows
the rationale to be some combination of providing
choice, reducing the prevalence of disability, reducing
costs, and acting to benefit pregnant women) it seems that
the latter is not necessarily any more vulnerable to
eugenics-critiques than the former. This is because,
firstly, it is at least arguable that ‘liberal eugenics’ is still
eugenics and hence ‘pure choice’ can have eugenic effects
and can allow prospective parents to enact eugenic pref-
erences. Secondly it is because, in terms of the effects on
the disabled population and the ‘message sent out’, there
may be little practical difference between a system which
aims to reduce the prevalence of disability, and one which
aims only to promote choice but with the knowledge that
the vast majority of women will use that choice to ‘select
against’ disability.
2.3 Does Pure Choice have
unpalatable implications?
Another challenge for the Pure Choice model is that, if we
were to concede that choice is the sole justification for
PNS, that raises the question of why the choices offered
should be limited to serious health conditions and dis-
abilities. If choice is the fundamental good, why not offer
pregnant women as much choice as possible?
One answer to this, one that could come from within
the Pure Choice paradigm, is to say that simply maximiz-
ing the number of available options is not necessarily the
best way of maximizing meaningful choice, or of respect-
ing autonomy (which is what matters more fundamen-
tally). This suggestion is comparable to what people
sometimes say about certain kinds of market failure. For
example, in the UK, there is presently a public debate
about whether householders are being made to choose
15 P. Woodward, ed. The Doctrine of Double Effect: philosophers debate
a controversial moral principle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press. 2001.
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between too many different complex energy tariffs for
energy. According to a 2009 Which? Report:
. . . baffling bills and an array of complex tariffs make
it very difficult for consumers to understand what gas
and electricity schemes they are using and reduce
their energy consumption and costs. Which? is calling
on energy suppliers, the Government and Ofgem [the
energy regulator] to take immediate steps to simplify
bills and tariffs.16
Allegedly the complex array of tariffs makes it less
likely that consumers will engage with the market and less
likely that they will make good choices. For this reason,
some political parties are proposing that consumer choice
should be reduced (i.e. there should be fewer tariffs) in
order to simplify the market and to make it more likely
that householders will make good choices. One might
then say something similar about PNS. If women are
offered too many choices, too many tests, they may
become confused and either make bad choices, or fail to
engage with the decision-making process and uncritically
accept the views of their doctors or midwives.
What should we make of this argument? Well, it is an
argument which in principle could count against a very
radical ‘individualized choice’ model of PNS: one in
which women are offered a wide and potentially confus-
ing array of tests.17 Whether however this argument
works in practice depends on how complex and difficult
to grasp the various options are, on how the relevant
information is presented, and on how well-equipped dif-
ferent women are to comprehend the information. These
are all matters about which it would be unwise to gener-
alize in the absence of solid empirical evidence.
Also, returning to the potential problem for the Pure
Choice view (the suggestion that, if choice is the funda-
mental good, why not offer pregnant women as much
choice as possible?) it is not clear that this argument
about autonomy and complexity is going to save the Pure
Choice view from the initial objection, because some of
the choices at stake are not very complicated.
Take sex selection again. Whether one’s baby will be a
boy or a girl is a pretty simple thing to grasp and sex
testing is pretty straightforward. So, if someone believes
in the Pure Choice view, shouldn’t she also believe that
women should be provided with fetal sex testing with the
option of termination if the fetus is not of the desired sex?
Or if fetal testing were possible for eye or hair colour
or height, shouldn’t pregnant women be offered the
opportunity to end those pregnancies too if it
looks as if their future child will not have the desired
characteristics?
A natural response to these suggestions is to say that
abortion is a morally serious business and that the health
service is justified in supporting screening and abortion
only where the woman has a very good reason for ending
a pregnancy, such as the detection of serious fetal abnor-
mality, as opposed to a trivial reason, such as a preference
about sex or cosmetic features. Now this response may or
may not be right; whether it is or not is a huge issue and
not one that can be tackled here. But, even if it is right,
crucially it is not one that is available to proponents of
the Pure Choice view. If the sole reason for allowing
testing and termination is to provide women with choices
(rather than some other reason, like women’s interests,
public health, or cost-saving) then there is no basis for
treating fetal disability differently from fetal sex; for the
justification that applies to screening and termination in
the case of disability (‘freedom to choose’) applies equally
to screening and termination in the case of sex selection.
As Ann Furedi puts it:
We either support women’s capacity to decide, or we
don’t. You can’t be pro-choice except when you don’t
like the choice, because that’s not pro-choice at all.18
This seems highly plausible. If choice is the ultimate
value appealed to, it cannot just apply to those choices we
approve of. Hence, proponents of the Pure Choice view
face a dilemma. Either they must restrict the range of
choices that they are willing to support and face charges
of inconsistency (only supporting the ‘choices that they
like’), or they must apply their pro-choice view consist-
ently and support screening and termination for reasons
many would regard as trivial and unacceptable.
If this is a problem for the Pure Choice view, does the
Public Health Pluralist view fare any better? Yes it does,
for the Public Health Pluralist view can appeal to other
goals or values to differentiate sex selection (for example)
from ‘selecting out’ fetal disease and disability. In par-
ticular, as we have seen, a central tenet of Public Health
Pluralism is that PNS programmes should aim to reduce
the prevalence of disease and disability in the new-born
population; this clearly provides a basis on which to say
that screening for fetal abnormalities is justified, whereas
arguably screening for sex and cosmetic features is not.
So, in this respect, the Public Health Pluralism is prefer-
able to Pure Choice.
It is important also to note again that I am talking here
about whether or not the state should actively support
16 Which? Consumers Confused about Range of Energy Tariffs,
May 2009 http://www.which.co.uk/switch/news/2009/05/consumers
-confused-about-range-of-energy-tariffs-186296.
17 E. Boormans et al. Individualized choice in prenatal diagnosis: the
impact of karyotyping and standalone rapid aneuploidy detection on
quality of life. Prenat Diagn 2010; 30: 928–936.
18 A. Furedi. You can’t be pro-choice only when you like the choice.
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(by funding and/or providing) particular types of PNS –
not merely about whether (for example) sex-selective
abortion should be legally permitted. This makes the
argument just outlined more powerful than it otherwise
would be. For if we were just talking about the legal
permissibility of sex selection, then proponents of the
Pure Choice view could easily ‘bite the bullet’ and say
that sex selection should be allowed. This is not a popular
view but it is one that could conceivably be defended
within a generally liberal ethico-legal framework.19
However, if we are talking about state funding and
support then consistency requires proponents of the Pure
Choice view to go further and to advocate not merely the
legal permissibility of sex-selective abortion, but the state
funding of this as well: a position that many proponents
of Pure Choice will find unappealing.
3. ENSURING THAT ABORTION
DECISIONS ‘REMAIN PERSONAL’
This section addresses a concern about using PNS to
achieve public health goals (and hence a possible objec-
tion to Public Health Pluralism): de Jong et al.’s claim
that we must:
. . . ensure that abortion decisions remain personal and
are not turned into instruments of societal goals, such
as prevention and cost-reduction by bringing down the
number of people requiring life-long and costly care.20
There are two worries here. One (the subject of this
section) is that, given the morally controversial and sen-
sitive nature of abortion, the state should not use it as a
means of achieving its goals (be they public health or
anything else); while a second (considered in the next
section) is that using PNS and abortion to achieve public
health goals may generate consent problems.
Much of the ethical concern about PNS programmes
relates to the fact that they achieve their goals primarily
by increasing the frequency of abortion for fetuses with
impairments. PNS programmes can improve public
health in other ways as well (for example, by taking
targeted steps during pregnancy to improve maternal or
fetal health, or by enabling parents to prepare themselves
to care for a sick or disabled child) but the most signifi-
cant aspect is selective termination.
Some people are opposed to all (or nearly all) abortion
and believe that the state should not even be allowing, let
alone encouraging or funding, abortions whether con-
nected to PNS or not. This is not an obviously incoherent
position. However, it must be side-lined for the present
because such concerns are too general to underpin an
argument specifically against PNS (and a fortiori against
a specific model of PNS). These arguments are not
what we need because they count against all abortion,
rather than specifically against using PNS and selective
termination.
Having side-lined very general anti-abortion argu-
ments, what others remain? One is that, where practica-
ble, the state should use means other than abortion to
achieve public health goals. Another related thought is
that ‘earlier’ selective reproduction is always to be pre-
ferred to ‘later’ (other things being equal). Thus precon-
ception selection (e.g. of gametes or gamete donors) is
preferable to preimplantation embryo selection, which in
turn is preferable to ‘earlier’ abortion, which in turn is
preferable to ‘later’ abortion. This is a widely held view
and one that coheres with a plausible gradualist view of
embryonic or fetal moral status. As de Jong et al. put it:
. . . the dominant opinion in most western countries,
often also reflected in legislation, is that the moral
status of the embryo/fetus progressively increases with
its development (the gradualist view).21
These points however are perhaps less arguments
against PNS and selective termination, and more ethical
side-constraints on policy.
Take Down’s syndrome again and let us assume (at
least for the sake of argument) that reducing the preva-
lence of Down’s in the new-born population is a legiti-
mate public health goal. There are various different
(non-mutually exclusive) ways in which this goal might be
achieved and we can order these in terms of ‘earlier’ or
‘later’ positions in the reproductive process. Earliest of all
are preconception interventions, such as encouraging
women not to delay reproduction until their forties, or
folic acid supplementation (which is also a possible
during-pregnancy intervention).22 Next, at the embryonic
19 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), Sex Selec-
tion: options for regulation (a report on the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority’s (HFEA’s) 2002–3 review of sex selection includ-
ing a discussion of legislative and regulatory options) (2003). http://
www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Final_sex_selection_main_report.pdf; L. Purdy.
Is preconception sex selection necessarily sexist? RBM Online 2007; 15:
33–37; J. Robertson. Preconception gender selection. Am J Bioeth 2001;
1: 2–9; J. Savulescu & E. Dahl. Sex selection and preimplantation
diagnosis: a response to the Ethics Committee of the American
Society of Reproductive Medicine. Hum Reprod 2000; 15: 1879–1880;
Wilkinson, op. cit. note 8; S. Wilkinson. Sexism, sex selection and
‘family balancing’. Medical L Rev 2008; 16: 369–389.
20 A. de Jong et al. Advances in prenatal screening: the ethical dimen-
sion. Nat Rev Genet 2011; 12; 657–63: 657.
21 A. de Jong et al. Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues
explored. Eur. J. Hum. Genet 2010; 18: 272–77: 274; R. Dworkin. Life’s
Dominion: an argument about abortion and euthanasia. London: Harper
Collins. 1993; J. Feinberg, ed. Abortion. In: Freedom and Fulfillment.
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, 37–75; R. Scott. Rights,
duties and the body: law and ethics of the maternal-fetal conflict. Oxford:
Hart Publishing; 2002. 43–56.
22 H. Cuckle. Primary prevention of Down’s syndrome. Int J Med Sci
2005; 2: 93.
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stage, we have the possibility of IVF with pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, which could be used to
screen out affected embryos.23 Finally, there is antenatal
detection using blood tests and/or ultrasound scans, com-
bined with the possibility of termination and then, within
antenatal detection, we may differentiate between earlier
and later tests.
The point of the example is that there is no reason why
a supporter of PNS for Down’s syndrome couldn’t also
support pre-conception measures to avoid Down’s, and
(where appropriate) PGD to avoid Down’s. What is
more, she may well prefer these interventions (especially
the preconception ones) because they are going to be less
traumatic for the woman and bypass ethical concerns
about abortion. However, pre-conception and pre-
implantation measures are not always available, practi-
cable, or acceptable to the reproductive community. In
the case of Down’s, for example, persuading women to
have children when they are younger is not going to be
easy, and it would be wrong to exert undue pressure on
the over-forties not to reproduce, while IVF/PGD may
not be worthwhile for all but the most ‘high risk’ couples.
In these circumstances, it will often be necessary to fall
back on PNS as the only effective and feasible strategy
for Down’s prevention.
So the proper role of the undesirability of abortion in
the argument seems to be this. Supporters of PNS can
and should concede that, where practicable, means other
than PNS and abortion should be used to achieve public
health goals. Leading alternatives include informing pro-
spective parents about lifestyle and nutritional changes
that reduce their risk of conceiving a disabled fetus, and
embryo selection within the context of IVF. But, given
that these ‘earlier’ means may not always be available, or
may carry with them other disadvantages, there is none-
theless still a role (in practice, a significant role) for PNS.
In addition, other things being equal, ‘earlier’ versions
of PNS (i.e. earlier within pregnancy) are to be preferred
to ‘later’ ones. So if, as seems reasonably likely, scientists
manage to develop a non-invasive prenatal test for
Down’s that is just as accurate as today’s tests and yet can
be administered earlier on in pregnancy, then such a
development is to be welcomed.24 Or at least it is to be
welcomed as far as concerns about abortion are con-
cerned; it may carry with it other disadvantages.25
So to conclude: these concerns about abortion do not
entail that we must never use PNS and selective termina-
tion as a means of achieving public health goals.
However, any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism
(and any ethical PNS programme) will take on board the
moral seriousness and sensitivity of abortion and will
advocate, where practicable, alternative means of reduc-
ing the prevalence of disease and disability; but where
there is no practicable alternative, facilitating selective
abortion may still be justified. As regards the particular
concern about abortion decisions ‘remaining personal’,
proponents of both Pure Choice and Public Health Plu-
ralism can agree that this is first and foremost a matter of
ensuring that pregnant women’s choices and consents are
sufficiently voluntary and informed. That is the issue to
which I now turn.
4. INFORMATION, UNDERSTANDING,
AND CONSENT
The foundation of the contemporary provision of pre-
natal screening and diagnosis is the recognition of
patients’ individual right[s] to decide whether or not
they wish to receive testing and then to make repro-
ductive choices based on test results. At a minimum,
informed consent requires that patients have sufficient
relevant information and that their decisions are vol-
untary and uninfluenced by external pressures whether
they be medical insurance, societal, or political.26
Another set of concerns relates to consent. The general
form of the worry is that if governments or national
health services seek to reduce the prevalence of disability
and disease in future generations by encouraging and
providing PNS, this will create cases in which pregnant
women’s consents (to screening and testing, and/or to
termination) are defective or invalid. One version of this
argument says that often pregnant women are not suffi-
ciently well-informed to give valid consent. This could be
either because the information provided by the healthcare
system is inadequate or biased, or because the array of
tests and choices on offer to pregnant women is too
complex for them to understand adequately. A second
version says that sometimes pregnant women’s consents
are not sufficiently voluntary because of general social
pressure; it is argued that unduly negative social attitudes
to disability, alongside a lack of social support for those
caring for disabled children, combine to dissuade preg-
nant women from continuing their pregnancies once fetal
disability has been detected.
This article focuses just on the first version (the
claim that there is a problem with information or
23 The UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has a list
of conditions that it has decided may acceptably be tested for and
‘screened out’ using PGD. This list includes Down’s syndrome. http://
www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm.
24 R. Chiu et al. Non-invasive prenatal assessment of trisomy 21 by
multiplexed maternal plasma DNA sequencing: large scale validity
study. BMJ 2011: 342.
25 A. van den Heuvel et al. Will the introduction of non-invasive pre-
natal diagnostic testing erode informed choices? An experimental study
of health care professionals. Patient Educ Couns 2010; 78: 24–28.
26 P. Benn & A. Chapman. Ethical Challenges in Providing
Non-invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, Curr Opin Obstet Gynecol 2010; 22:
128–134: 130.
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understanding) and will say very little about the
voluntariness argument. This is because if general societal
pressure to avoid having a disabled child is the source of a
consent problem, then this is something with implications
for all reproductive decisions with a disability dimension,
regardless of which particular model of PNS is adopted.
In other words, if there is undue general social pressure to
avoid becoming the parent of child with a disability, then
this will be at least as much a problem (as far as consent is
concerned) under a Pure Choice model as it is under a
Public Health Pluralist model. So there is a sense in which
this concern functions at too general a level to engage with
the specific interests of this article. Also, the academic
debate about consent, coercion, and ‘social pressure’ is
large and complex and has been covered extensively else-
where; so, for reasons of space and focus, it is best not
simply to rehash that material here.27
Turning then to information and understanding, it is
perhaps tempting initially to give this issue fairly short
shrift: not because it is not important, but just because
there is little reason to think that the information issues
faced by pregnant women undergoing antenatal screen-
ing are fundamentally different from those faced by
patients in any other part of the health service. Thus for
pregnant women, as for many other patient groups, there
will be cases in which the information provided by
healthcare professionals leaves a lot to be desired,
because it is biased or insufficient. Benn and Chapman,
for example, state that:
Issues have been raised about the completeness, accu-
racy, and bias in the information physicians currently
communicate to mothers who have received a prenatal
diagnosis of Down syndrome . . . Also, while profes-
sional societies’ guidelines subscribe to the norm of
nondirective counselling, some physicians and genetic
professionals admit to overemphasizing the negative
aspects of Down syndrome or even urging pregnant
women to seek a termination.28
We should of course be ready to condemn poor
consent practice wherever it occurs and to seek improve-
ment and, as Rafi and Chitty note, particularly in the
light of developments such as non-invasive prenatal diag-
nosis, ‘we will need to maintain high standards of coun-
selling to facilitate informed consent taking account of
cultural variation’.29 But it is hard to see either why this is
an inevitable flaw in PNS, or why this carves it out as
different from any other area of healthcare delivery. Also
it is worth noting that, at least as a matter of official
policy, bodies like the UKNational Health Service go out
of their way to be non-directive about conditions like
Down’s syndrome.30
It is however worth looking at another variant of the
information argument. Whereas the concerns considered
so far focussed on failings in the health services, this
alternative argument suggests instead that some aspects
of screening are in practice impossible for many patients
to understand, even if their healthcare professionals’
consent practice is excellent. One of the main things that
supposedly is too hard to grasp is the inevitably proba-
bilistic and uncertain nature of some prenatal tests.
Milligan, for instance, cites ‘poor understanding of the
probabilistic and statistical language of risk’.31 Many
screening tests are not capable of showing with near cer-
tainly that the fetus does or does not have Condition X.
Rather what they show is that there is a 75% of its having
Condition X, an 85% chance of Condition Y, and a 50%
chance of Condition Z, etc..
Clearly some women have a good understanding of
probability and risk in pregnancy, not least because
female obstetricians and statisticians themselves become
pregnant from time to time. So the argument only
applies, if it works at all, to that majority of women
whom (it is supposed) have a poor understanding of
probability and risk. There is then a major empirical
question here about just how poor that majority’s under-
standing is. I do not propose to tackle that here except to
note that it does seem plausible to suppose that people
generally have a reasonably poor grasp of probabilities
expressed as percentages and of risk. And, at least for the
sake of argument let’s allow that this is the case, in
general and specifically in relation to prenatal testing.
What would follow from that?
One way to go is to have a not very demanding con-
ception of informed consent and to say that, so long as
the healthcare professionals have provided the relevant
information in a reasonable form, then they have dis-
charged their obligations and the consent is informed (in
that the information has been provided) even though
understanding is not guaranteed. If we took this route
then there would not be an ethical consent problem, but
there are at least two reasons for not having such a mini-
malist view of consent. First, that is not how valid
consent is generally understood these days. And second,
it is not clear what the point of providing the information
27 This debate arises in a number of very different areas. See, for
example: R. Catsanos et al. The Ethics of Uterus Transplantation. Bio-
ethics 2013; 27: 65–73; S. Sheldon & S. Wilkinson. Female Genital
Mutilation and Cosmetic Surgery: regulating non-therapeutic body
modification. Bioethics 1998; 12: 263–285; A. Wertheimer. Consent to
Sexual Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003.
28 Benn & Chapman, op. cit. note 26, p. 131.
29 I. Rafi & L. Chitty. Cell-Free Fetal DNA and non-invasive prenatal
testing. B J Gen Pract 2009; 59: 146–148.
30 UK National Screening Committee, Screening Tests for You and
Your Baby, 2012, www.screening.nhs.uk, p. 29. See also: http://
www.arc-uk.org/.
31 E. Milligan. The Ethics of Consent and Choice in Prenatal Screening.
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars; 2011. 14.
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is, or indeed what the point of informed consent is, if we
take little or no interest in whether the recipients of that
information have understood it.
A different approach to a parallel issue is explored in a
paper by Dawson on informed consent in clinical trials.
Dawson enquired about the implications, for the ethics of
consent, of the fact that many trial participants seem not
to be able to grasp important aspects of the research
process, in particular randomization. Dawson offers
what he calls the Unattainability Argument, which goes
as follows.
1. It is claimed that we ought to obtain IC [informed
consent] from competent adult research participants
2. We cannot obtain IC in a significant number of cases
3. Where we cannot actually obtain IC, it makes no
sense to require it.
Conclusion: It makes no sense to require IC.32
It does not take much imagination to see how one
might construct a parallel argument for PNS –
A. It is claimed that we ought to obtain informed
consent from pregnant women before undertaking
PNS
B. We cannot obtain informed consent in a significant
number of cases
C. Where we cannot actually obtain informed consent,
it makes no sense to require it.
Conclusion: It makes no sense to require informed
consent for (some/many types of) PNS.
This, then, is one way of responding to the impossibil-
ity of understanding. If understanding is impossible, and
if understanding is required for informed consent, then
informed consent cannot be ethically required. For
‘ought implies can’: we cannot be morally required to do
something impossible.
So what impact do these concerns about information
and understanding have on the ethics of PNS?
The ‘first line’ response to such consent worries must
always be to work hard on making clinical practice as
good as it can be, in terms of making the information as
accessible and digestible as possible for pregnant women
who are offered tests. But let’s allow, for the sake of
argument at least, that this sometimes fails. What then
should we say?
The first thing to keep in mind is that these concerns,
especially those relating to the comprehension of prob-
ability and risk, are not unique to PNS. Dawson, as
mentioned earlier, argues that similar issues arise in
biomedical research and I would add that if such claims
about people’s inability to understand are true, they will
affect a very wide range of everyday life choices, includ-
ing for example people’s capacity to make adequately
informed choices about important financial services
(insurance, loans, mortgages, etc.). While we have reason
to be concerned about the quality of choice and consent
in PNS, as in other areas of healthcare, it looks as if the
position of PNS is not obviously worse than that of other
important areas of life.
Which of the two models can cope best with this
consent issue: Pure Choice or Public Health Pluralism?
Pure Choice will be especially vulnerable to consent prob-
lems for, on this view, the sole reason for providing PNS
is to give choice. But if these choices (and consents) are
‘defective’ (because based on information which is not
understood) and hence not meaningful or properly
autonomous, the whole point of providing screening
seems to be undermined. Public Health Pluralism, on the
other hand, may be better placed to withstand consent
problems, since – while it values choice and consent – it
appeals to other goals and values too.
So, to conclude, it can be argued that if governments or
national health services seek to reduce the prevalence of
disability and disease in future generations by encourag-
ing PNS, this will create additional cases in which preg-
nant women’s consents (to screening and testing, and/or
to termination) are defective or invalid.
Against this, I argued initially that the consent problem
is not as bad, or at least not as intractable, as is sometimes
supposed. One reason for this is a certain degree of opti-
mism about our ability to get pregnant women to under-
stand the tests on offer. A second is the suggestion that (if
the concern is about people’s ability to understand prob-
ability) PNS is in no worse a position than (say) financial
services or gambling. Yet another reason is the argument
(inspired by Dawson) which says that, if our consent
requirements cannot possibly be met, then we would be
well-advised either to modify the information standards
(so that they can be met) or, more radically, to drop the
informed consent requirement altogether, rather than
concluding that PNS is all irredeemably unethical.
Furthermore, even if it is conceded that there is a
consent issue, that pregnant women are often unable to
give informed consent to PNS, this does not count
against Public Health Pluralism. For consent would then
be a problem area for PNS regardless of which model was
adopted. Furthermore, it is liable to be a bigger problem
for Pure Choice than for Public Health Pluralism since –
whereas Public Health Pluralism values autonomy and
choice amongst several other things – for Pure Choice,
the fundamental reason for providing PNS is to enable
choice. So if the choices made and consents provided turn
out to be somehow ‘defective’ and hence not meaningful
or properly autonomous, the whole point of providing
32 A. Dawson. The normative status of the requirement to gain an
informed consent in clinical trials: comprehension, obligations, and
empirical evidence. In The Limits of Consent: a socio-ethical approach to
human subject research in medicine. O. Corrigan et al., ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2009. 99–114: 101.
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screening is undermined. Public Health Pluralism, on the
other hand, may still be able to defend at least some kinds
of PNS on grounds other than choice.
So either the consent issue is surmountable, in which
case there is no (major) consent problem for either side in
the debate, or it is insurmountable, in which case it is a
problem for both Public Health Pluralism and Pure
Choice, but arguably more so for the latter. Interestingly
this general conclusion also applies to other consent argu-
ments not considered in detail here: such as the claim that
pregnant women’s consents to screening and termination
are vitiated by general social pressure to avoid having a
child with a disability (in the form of, for example, lack of
financial support for families with disabled children, or
lack of access to health and social services).
5. CONCLUSION
This article critiques the Pure Choice rationale for state-
supported PNS by comparing it with a possible alterna-
tive, Public Health Pluralism. It argues that we have
reasons to prefer the latter including the following. First,
Public Health Pluralism does not (as is often supposed)
render PNS more vulnerable to objections couched in
terms of eugenics. Second, the Pure Choice view, if fol-
lowed through to its logical consequences, may have
some unpalatable implications, such as extending choice
well beyond health screening. Third, any sensible version
of Public Health Pluralism (and any ethical PNS
programme) will take on board the moral seriousness and
sensitivity of abortion and will advocate, where practica-
ble, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of
disease and disability; but where there is no practicable
alternative, facilitating selective abortion may still be jus-
tified. Hence, Public Health Pluralism is not especially
vulnerable to criticisms based on the undesirability of
abortion. Finally, Public Health Pluralism is entirely con-
sistent with valuing autonomy and consent and is not
especially vulnerable to consent problems. Indeed, as we
have just seen, if consent is a ‘problem area’ for PNS then
this will be a problem for both Public Health Pluralism
and Pure Choice, but arguably it is an even bigger
problem for the latter.
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